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The debate over the social value of secured credit (and the ap-
propriate priority for secured claims in bankruptcy) is entering its
nineteenth year. Yet the continuing publication of succeeding gener-
ations of articles exploring the topic have yielded precious little in the
way of an emerging scholarly consensus about the nature and func-
tion of secured credit.1 Put simply, we still do not have a theory, of
finance that explains why firms sometimes (but not always) issue se-
cured debt rather than unsecured debt or equity. Moreover (and per-
haps because of the lack of any plausible general theory), we lack any
persuasive empirical data to predict whether, in any particular case, a
later security-financed project will generate sufficient returns to offset
any reduction in the value (i.e., the bankruptcy share) of prior un-
secured claims.
1 For a review of the early debate, see F.H. Buckley, The Bankruptcy Priority Puzzle, 72
VA. L. Rnv. 1393 (1986); Thomas H.Jackson &Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and
Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE LJ. 1143 (1979); Saul Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in
Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 YALE LJ. 49 (1982); Alan Schwartz, A Theory of Loan
Priorities, 18J. LEGAL STUD. 209 (1989); Alan Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priori-
ties: A Review of Current Theories, 10J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1981); Alan Schwartz, The Continuing
Puzzle of Secured Debt 37 V~AD. L. REv. 1051 (1984) [herinafter Schwartz, The Continuing
Puzzle]; Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing 86 COLUM. L. Rzv. 901
(1986); Paul M. Shupack, Solving the Puzzle ofSecured Transactions, 41 RUTGERs L. Rxv. 1067
(1989); James J. White, Efficiency Justifications for Personal Property Security, 37 VAND. L. REv.
473 (1984).
A second generation of articles added new voices, but little in the way of an emerging
consensus. See Barry E. Adler, An Equity-Agency Solution to the Bankruptcy-Priority Puzzle, 22J.
LEGAL STUD. 73 (1993); Richard L. Barnes, The Efficieny Justfication for Secured Transactions:
Foxes with Soxes and OtherFanciful Stuff, 42 KuN. L. REv. 13 (1993);James W. Bowers, Whither
What Hits the Fan?: Murphy's Law, Bankruptcy Theory, and the Elementary Economics of Loss
Distribution, 26 GA. L. REv. 27 (1991); Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Property-
Based Theory of Security Interests: Taking Debtors' Choices Seriously, 80 VA. L. REv. 2021 (1994);
Hideki Kanda & Saul Levmore, Explaining Creditor Priorities, 80 VA. L. REv. 2103 (1994);
Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80 VA. L. Rav. 1887 (1994); Randal C.
Picker, Security Interests, Misbehavior, and Common Pools, 59 U. Cm. L. REv. 645 (1992);
George G. Triantis, Secured Debt Under Conditions of Imperfect Information, 21 J. LEGAL STUD.
225 (1992).
A third generation of scholarship has appeared within the past year. See, e.g., Lucian
Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy,
105 YALE L.J. 857 (1996); RonaldJ. Mann, Explaining the Pattern of Secured Credit, 110 HAM.v.
L. REv. 625 (1997). The articles in this Symposium will no doubt add more fuel to the fire.
To date, there is little evidence that anyone has tried to review the literature for any pur-
pose other than to assert that most (if not all) prior contributions are flawed.
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The security debate has generated more heat than light because
the opposing sides have divided primarily along methodological
rather than normative lines. As a result, each side has generally failed
to learn from, and adjust to, the legitimate insights offered by the
other. But although we have much to learn, there is much about se-
cured financing that we already know. In this Article, I build upon
the existing scholarship and seek to answer three questions. First,
what are the right (and the wrong) questions to ask if we are to ad-
vance our understanding of secured credit and its appropriate prior-
ity? Second, what do we know (and not know) about the answers to
any of these questions? Third, what normative stance is justified in a
world of uncertainty in which may of the key questions are unlikely to
be answered for some time (if ever)?
Before I proceed, however, one needs first to separate and classify
the participants in this debate. The division, perhaps predictably, is
between those who believe that truth comes from the top down (the
theorists) and those that believe that truth is built from the bottom up
(the empiricists or contextualists). These categories are quite broad,
however. Some of those who begin with theory have sought to test
their claims against available evidence, while some of those whose be-
liefs are shaped by experience and context have sought to critique the
theory on its own terms. In neither case, however, have these forays
into the other domain been very successful. Moreover, because the
divide is methodological, the participants rarely join issue on particu-
lar normative claims. Some theorists are skeptical about the efficiency
claims of secured credit, while others have sought to fashion positive
theories that purport to explain some (or all) of the patterns of fi-
nancing that we observe. On the other side, a common hostility to-
ward (or skepticism about) economic theory joins together those who
passionately defend the institution of secured credit as a major con-
tributor to social welfare with those who seek to restrict the priority
granted to secured interests in bankruptcy. The end product of this
strange conversation has been a tendency to recycle old ideas and old
criticism and to pay more attention to the methodological warfare
than the search for truth. In the process, the few genuine insights
that the debate has generated-both empirical and theoretical-have
largely been overlooked.
The Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, I identify the necessary
and sufficient questions that we must ask (and answer) before we can
resolve the issues that divide us. These questions can be grouped con-
veniently into two separate categories. The first set of questions are
conceptual. Each seeks to respond to the inquiry: why do debtors
issue security? The second set of questions are observational: what
explains what we see? Only by working to resolve both sets of ques-
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tions can we begin to understand the nature and function of secured
credit.
I use this framework in Part II to focus on what we do (and do
not) know about secured financing. I conclude that the best theoreti-
cal explanation for secured credit that survives observation centers on
the unique advantages of leverage over the debtor provided by the
foreclosure options given to secured creditors in Article 9. The lever-
age of secured credit is used to solve several different contracting
problems for certain classes of debtors and creditors. These solutions
carry both social and private benefits as well as offsetting costs. The
social benefits derive from the ability of security-created leverage to
control vexing problems of overinvestment and underinvestment that
are ubiquitous in financial contracting. The private benefits derive
from the use of leverage to improve repayment probabilities vis-a-vis
other creditors. Unhappily, the costs of security are high, and thus,
security is observed in the world only where the social and private ben-
efits work in combination. This combination of social and private
benefits means that the answer to the question whether secured credit
does (or does not) promote social welfare is both currently unknown
and unknowable.
Finally, in Part HI, I offer some views about which normative
claims should reveal in a world of uncertainty. Some claims for re-
stricting the priority of secured credit (either in bankruptcy or by
amendment to Article 9) rest on distributional fairness. To the extent
that secured credit redistributes wealth, that redistribution is largely
regressive. Thus, the normative bite of any claim grounded in distri-
butional fairness turns largely on the perceived inadequacy of the Arti-
cle 9 filing system to alert unsophisticated debtors to the risks of
subordination. Other arguments for limiting the priority of secured
claims rest on the potential inefficiencies of secured financing. The
available evidence suggests that secured credit may generate net inef-
ficiencies, but the magnitude of those inefficiencies is unknown. In a
world of uncertainty, therefore, I argue that the intellectual burden of
proof should turn on an analysis of the political economy of both the
Article 9 and bankruptcy lawmaking processes. Will the lawmaking
processes that shape both Article 9 and the Bankruptcy Code enact
optimal legal rules, assuming they can be identified ex ante? And, are
there any reasons to prefer one legislative product to the other? I
conclude that, in formulating normative recommendations to policy-
makers, scholars should focus less on relatively small efficiency gains
or losses in formulating the optimal legal rules, and more on the effi-





ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS
The fundamental problem with the ongoing debate over the so-
cial value of secured credit is that the participants are not asking the
same questions (even when they are purporting to evaluate the contri-
butions of others). Moreover, few if any participants in the debate are
asking the right questions (or, if they are, they fail to link the ques-
tions they are asking with others equally important to any resolution
of the central issues). Properly conceived, the line of questions runs
from the abstract and theoretical to the concrete and contextual. Too
often, scholars have begun at one pole of this continuum with insuffi-
cient appreciation of the significance of following the line of inquiry
to the other pole. The simple truth is that we will not come to under-
stand the nature and function of secured credit in our economic sys-
tem without both a sound theoretical foundation and a thorough
knowledge of how particular security devices function, not only in the
world, but also in relation to the peculiar regulatory regime of federal
bankruptcy law and the Uniform Commercial Code.
A. Why Do Debtors Issue Security?
One of the most profound areas of misunderstanding between
those who focus on theory and those who start from experience oc-
curs at the outset when the fundamental question is posed: Is secured
debt efficient? The problem stems from the fact that this deceptively
simple question actually embraces at least three very different
questions.
1. What Theory of Finance Explains Why (And Predicts When)
Debtors Will Issue Secured Debt Rather than Unsecured Debt
or Equity?
Properly understood, this theoretical question is what is implied
by asking whether secured debt is efficient. It is not the same as asking
a related empirical question: would both prior creditors and the
debtor be better off if a project with positive expected value was fi-
nanced with secured debt? Nor is it the same as asking whether these
same creditors and debtors would be better off assuming the project
could only be financed with secured debt. This latter question merely
begs the theoretical question, because it then requires a further ques-
tion: why are certain debtors unable to finance positive value projects
with unsecured debt (assuming creditors can adjust rates of return to
reflect changes in risk)? Indeed, the theoretical question cannot be
answered by any claim about the current state of the world per se.
Rather, it is a comparative question. What welfare theory explains why
debtors issue secured debt (sometimes but not always) rather than is-
1440 [Vol. 82:1436
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suing unsecured debt or equity? Put another way, what are the wel-
fare advantages to the firm of financing certain projects with secured
debt that are superior to alternative methods of financing those
projects? 2
The "efficiency question" follows from the premises that creating
secured debt is costly and that selling priority claims to particular
creditors will necessarily reduce the value of unsecured claims relative
to alternative methods of financing the project. What makes this question
interesting is precisely the fact that we live in a world in which some
debtors issue only unsecured debt, others issue primarily secured
debt, and still otfiers issue some debt secured and some unsecured.
Thus, security must offer some advantages, under some circum-
stances, to the financing parties (the debtor and the secured party)
that other alternatives cannot replicate. This much is clear. But what
are these advantages? There only three basic possibilities. First, secur-
ity may offer a means of reducing financing costs to the contracting
parties that increases the net expected value of the financing opportu-
nity. Second, security may offer a means of redistributing wealth from
other creditors to the contracting parties. Third, security may offer
combinations of these advantages that vary from circumstance to
circumstance.
The theoretical question is both the most daunting and the most
interesting in the secured financing debate. There are, however, im-
portant subsidiary questions that may be more tractable.
2. Does a Later Security-Financed Project Reduce the Value of Earlier
Unsecured Claims (And Would Positive Value Projects3 Be
Financed in a World Without Security)?
Most of the "contextualist" analyses of secured financing ignore
the theoretical question and focus instead on a more functional em-
pirical question: What is the effect of a later-in-time security-financed
project on the value of earlier-in-time unsecured claims? Quite
clearly, if the later-in-time project did not enhance firm value and thus
reduced the risk of bankruptcy for the firm, the subsequent granting
of security would reduce the value of prior unsecured claims. If the
project enhances firm value, and thus reduces the risk of bankruptcy
by more than it reduces the unsecured creditors' share of the firm's
assets upon bankruptcy, then financing this particular project with secured
debt is Kaldor-Hicks efficient.
2 SeeAlan Schwartz, Taking the Analysis ofSecurity Seriously, 80 VA. L. REv. 2073, 2075-
81 (1994).
3 By positive value project, I mean to include both growth opportunities as wel as
the liquidity needed to fully exploit existing projects.
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While this question is interesting empirically, it is not interesting
as a theoretical matter. This is because, "[i]n reality, ... the effect of
new financing on existing claims depends on what [the debtor's]
managers do with the [money]."'4 To the extent that (1) the new fi-
nancing is used to exploit positive value growth opportunities, and (2)
those growth opportunities provide greater coverage for the claims of
unsecured creditors than any concomitant reduction in the share of
firm assets should the firm become insolvent, the new financing is
efficient.5 To the extent that the managers dissipate some or all of the
proceeds of the new financing, or that the expected value of the addi-
tional coverage is less than the reduction in asset share, the new fi-
nancing redistributes wealth from existing creditors to the financing
creditor and the debtor's managers.
The empirical question is given more bite in the contemporary
debate by the claim of a number of the contextualists that many debt-
ors (particularly those facing a heightened risk of insolvency) can only
finance positive value projects by issuing secured debt.6 This assump-
tion is strong because it is counter-theoretical. Theory would predict
that in a world without secured credit, positive value projects could be
financed either with unsecured debt adjusted for risk or with equity.
(This follows from the conventional assumption that where the ex-
pected returns from a project are positive and financing sources can
balance their risk portfolios, a competitive market will generate fi-
nancing opportunities for the firm.) Thus, the claim, derived from
observation, that many debtors cannot otherwise finance growth op-
portunities or secure needed liquidity for existing projects that carry a
positive expected value leads inexorably to the familiar theoretical
puzzle: What are the cost-reducing benefits of security that cause it to
dominate other methods of financing in certain circumstances? And,
are those benefits benign (welfare-enhancing) or malign (redistribu-
tional) or both?
4 George G. Triantis, A Free-Cash-Flow Theory of Secured Debt and Creditor Priorities, 80
VA. L. REv. 2155, 2162 (1994).
5 See Triantis, supra note 1, at 235-36.
6 See, e.g., Harris & Mooney, supra note 1, at 2042-45; Homer Kripke, Law and Econom-
ics: Measuring the Economic Efficiency of Commercial Law in a Vacuum of Fact, 133 U. PA. L. REv.
929 (1985); Steven L. Schwarcz, The Easy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy,
47 DuKE LJ. (forthcoming Dec. 1997) (manuscript at 31, on file with author) (arguing that
"a debtor's real choice is often between borrowing on a secured basis and trying to reor-
ganize under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code").
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3. What Are the Effects of Systematic Nonadjustment by Earlier
Unsecured Debt on the Increased Nonpayment Risk Caused by
Subsequent Secured Debt?
Another way of getting at the secured credit puzzle is to challenge
its underlying assumption that unsecured creditors will adjust (either
ex ante or ex post) to the issuance of subsequent secured debt by
increasing their interest charges to reflect the reduction in the share
of the firm's assets available to unsecured claims upon insolvency. In
an important article, Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate
that many classes of unsecured debt will fail systematically to adjust
(or will be incapable of adjusting) to subsequent secured debt.7 In
addition to tort claimants and other classes of involuntary creditors,
suppliers and other trade creditors will often find it rational to assess
an average risk premium to account for the generic risk of future se-
cured debt rather than adjust interest charges in individual cases. Sys-
tematic nonadjustment raises a number of interrelated questions.
What are the efficiency effects of nonadjustment on debtors' financ-
ing choices? What are the distributional consequences of nonadjust-
ment? To some extent, the answers to these questions turn on the
resolution of the question posed earlier: Would subsequent positive
value projects be financed without secured debt? If secured debt is, in
certain circumstances, the optimal (or only) method of financing pos-
itive value projects, then the efficiency and distributional effects are
much different than if these projects could be financed, for example,
with unsecured debt protected by loan covenants.
B. What Explains the Peculiar Patterns of Security We Observe
and the Regulatory Scheme that Influences Those
Patterns?
The theoretical and empirical questions may seem tractable so
long as they are posed generically. But the question of whether to
grant secured creditors full priority in bankruptcy is a question one
can answer only in the context of the existing transactional reality in
which security is issued, and the particular regulatory regime of Arti-.
cle 9 of the UCC and the federal Bankruptcy Code. A much more
complex set of questions arises, therefore, when one asks whether any
of the attempts to justify or question secured credit can pass the fol-
lowing three demanding tests.
7 Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 1, at 880-95.
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1. When Do Debtors Issue Secured Debt and Why Do They Say that
They Do It?
Critics of the efficiency theorists have correctly observed those
theorists' tendency either to ignore data or to operationalize data by
shaping it to fit an appropriate theory.8 To be sure, much of the theo-
retical debate has failed to deal with the lacunae of secured credit.
Some firms rarely issue secured debt, some have a mixed portfolio,
and others issue most debt on a secured basis. What explains these
patterns? Contextualists argue for a bottom-up approach in which
speculations about the social value of security are built upon a better
understanding of why and when security is actually used in practice.
What are the patterns of secured financing that we observe in the
world and do they cohere with any of the theoretical speculations?
This question, however, is a good deal more demanding than
most of the contextualist scholars appear to recognize. For example,
how can one test the claim that subsequent secured debt that finances
positive value projects (either business growth or liquidity) is efficient
and distributionally fair? Central to the claim that such financing
should be encouraged is the assumption that the value-enhancing op-
portunity can best be financed (or in some cases can only be fi-
nanced) by secured debt. But how can that claim be tested? Some
contextualists propose to test it by reference to experience.
Financers, they assert, do not otherwise provide new money to viable
debtors who face a liquidity crisis. But is that practice a function of
the efficiency attributes of secured credit or the redistributional ef-
fects of nonadjusting unsecured claims (or both)? Unhappily, efforts
to determine the social utility of security by looking to existing prac-
tice are often subject to the naturalistic fallacy of seeking to derive
"what ought to be" from "what is".
Empirical observation can (and does), however, have a disciplin-
ing effect on those theories that seek to justify secured financing by
offering positive explanations for observed patterns of behavior.
Clearly, to the extent that explanatory theories are counter-factual,
they are undermined. Similarly, explanations for the use of security
that are built upon observations of existing practice must be tested
against a theoretical framework to determine whether they are norma-
tively benign or malign.
2. What Explains the Patterns of Regulation Embodied in Article 9 of
the UCC and the Bankruptcy Code?
In addition to the contextualist challenge to explain patterns of
observed behavior, a second challenge is to explain the patterns of
8 See Mann, supra note 1, at 628-29.
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legal regulation under which not all secured debt is equal. Some
forms of security are privileged over others. This bias is most appar-
ent in the exceptions that Article 9 establishes to its general first-in-
time principle. The first-in-time priority system is based upon the ac-
quisition and publication of a property right in the debtor's assets.9
Although this system may seem facially neutral, it in fact results in
granting certain classes of secured creditors specially-protected prior-
ity claims.
The first departure from the first-in-time principle is the ex-
traordinary protection afforded the floating lien. After an appropri-
ate filing, a general financing creditor may claim a priority in any or
all of the debtor's current and future assets, with the creditor's prior-
ity status fixed from the time of filing rather than from the time prop-
erty rights in particular assets are acquired. 10 The second major
exception to the first-in-time principle is the "superpriority" granted
to purchase money security interests. This priority status tramps even
prior creditors holding floating liens." The third exception to con-
sider concerns the priority of paperized assets, such as chattel paper
and instruments. A prior, perfected secured creditor will lose in a
priority contest with a subsequent purchaser of chattel paper who
gives value and takes possession in the ordinary course of business. 12
How can we understand these diverse rules of priority? And, to
what extent are these explanations compatible with either extant the-
ories or observed behavior in practice? Surprisingly, most scholars
have largely ignored this question, even though most, if not all, of the
participants in this debate-whether theorists or contextualists-are
lawyers. Thus, few, if any, of the prevailing theories seek to test
whether the peculiar pattern of priorities embedded in Article 9 can
be justified. Even more surprisingly, few, if any, of the contextualists
who seek to justify security by reference to observed behavior and re-
vealed preferences have examined whether theirjustification supports
or undermines the regulatory structure of Article 9. Property under-
stood, however, both the financing and the legal regulatory contexts
are crucial methods of testing various speculations about the relative
efficiency of secured credit.
Thus, for example, we need to ask: What justifies the floating
lien and the priority of subsequent advances? Even more startling
than the priority granted security interests in after-acquired assets is
9 See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 9-203 to -303 (1994); see also ALAN SciMvARTz & ROBERT E. SCOTT,
COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS: PRINCIPLES AND POUCIES 568 (2d ed. 1991) (discussing perfec-
tion under Article 9).
10 SeeU..C. §§ 9-204(3), 9-312(7) (1994); see also ScHwARTz & ScoTT, supra note 9, at
637-39 (discussing function of first-in-time rules).
11 See U.C.C. §§ 9-312(3), (4) (1994).
12 See id. § 9-308(a).
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the parallel protection offered to the floating lien creditor who elects
to make future, uncommitted advances to the debtor. Following an
appropriate filing, these advances will enjoy the same priority even
though they are made either without commitment or when the debt
supporting the initial security agreement has been fully repaid, or
even when the debtor faces imminent.insolvency. Theories of security
that seek to justify the priority of secured debt, either in general terms
or by reference to particular practices, must also confront Article 9's
existing scheme of priorities. In a thoughtful article, Steven Schwarcz
argues that new money secured debt is efficient and often constitutes
the only means available to viable debtors to solve liquidity crises.13
But if this is so, how can we square a new money explanation with the
peculiar advantages offered to floating lien creditors and purchase
money security interests (PMSIs) ?14 In neither case does the extraordi-
nary priority granted to these secured creditors fit the new money jus-
tification that Schwarcz develops from experience and observations
from practice.
3. To What Extent Does the Political Economy of the UCC and the
Bankruptcy Law-Making Process Influence Regulatory
Outcomes?
The failure of the current debate to integrate even a rudimentary
understanding of the political economy of the law-making process is
astonishing given the competing normative theories that suggest
either efficiency or redistributional explanations for secured debt.
Most of the commercial law that regulates secured credit originates
with private law-making groups. The American Law Institute (ALI)
and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws (NCCUSL), both "self-perpetuating organization[s] of lawyers,
judges, and academics,"' 5 have jointly created the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, America's most influential commercial statute. Article 9,
which regulates secured credit, is the centerpiece of that effort. Simi-
larly, the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 was based largely on work done by
the National Bankruptcy Conference. In formulating bankruptcy law,
the Conference, together with other bankruptcy-oriented private leg-
islatures, has a role that parallels in many respects the more en-
trenched private legislative efforts of the ALI and NCCUSL in
interpreting and revising the UCC.
13 Schwarcz, supra note 6, at 60-66. Schwarcz claims that new money secured credit is
class Pareto efficient, thus, unsecured creditors as a class should prefer full priority for
secured claims in bankruptcy and should want a debtor to have access to secured credit.
Id. at 63.
14 See U.C.C. § 9-107 (1994).
15 Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U.
PA. L. REv. 595, 596 (1995).
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While the product of these private legislatures is subject to ratifi-
cation either by the states or by Congress, respectively, the degree of
deference shown to these groups suggests that we should study them
in much the same way that political scientists study ordinary legisla-
tures.16 The current debate has evaluated the relevant legal rules as if
they were produced by rule-generating "black boxes." Although aca-
demics have not hesitated to critique the legal rules that regulate se-
cured credit, until recently, they have paid scant attention to the
internal workings of the institutions that produce such laws. As a re-
sult, a key question has often gone unasked: To what extent is the
legal regulation of secured credit a function of the law-making pro-
cess? In particular, to what extent is the private legislative process
more susceptible to interest group influence than the products of or-
dinary legislative bodies?17 The answer to this last question is crucial
to any normative evaluation of the priority to be granted to secured
claims. The arguments for and against granting frll priority to se-
cured credit must ultimately rise or fall with the justification for the
existing scheme of priorities entrenched in Article 9. Thus, the nor-
mative debate turns largely on the level of confidence that one has
about the ability of the lawmaking process to enact legal rules that are
generally congruent with social welfare.
II
WHAT WE Do (AND Do NOT) KNOW ABoU-r SECURED DEBT
The preceding discussion reveals the central difficulty with virtu-
ally all of the extant scholarship concerning the social value of se-
cured credit. The debate persists with relatively small increments of
progress largely because participants are asking fundamentally differ-
ent questions. It is not that either side is wrong; rather it is that both
sides are guilty of incomplete analyses. In truth, we cannot solve the
puzzle of secured credit until we have both a coherent theory of fi-
nance that explains the welfare benefits of security and a database (de-
rived from observation) that describes the patterns of security that
actually exist in the world. Only then can we evaluate the regulatory
regime of Article 9 and the Bankruptcy Code in order to make norma-
16 A literature on the political economy of private legislative groups, and especially
commercial statutes, is beginning to appear. See, e.g., Susan Block-Lieb, Congress's Tempta-
tion to Defect: A Political and Economic Theory of Legislative Resolutions to Financial Common Pool
Problems 39 Aiuz. L. Rav. 801 (1997); Eric A. Posner, The Political Economy of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, 96 MICH. L. REv. 47 (1997); Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, An
Economic Analysis of Uniform State Laws, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 131 (1996); Schwartz & Scott,
supra note 15; Robert E. Scott, The Politics of Article 9, 80 VA. L. Rv. 1783 (1994).
17 Both theory and casual empiricism point to the claim that in several important
respects, private legislative bodies, such as the ALI and NCCUSL do not function as well as
ordinary legislatures and are more susceptible to influence from dominant interest groups.
See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 15, at 650-51.
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five recommendations to policymakers. In this section, I seek to show
that, although we have gaps in our understanding, we are much closer
to the answers to our central questions than is commonly supposed.
A. The Search for a Theory of Secured Finance
Because the theoretical questions have been so imperfectly un-
derstood, it may be useful to repeat them. The question at the core of
the secured financing puzzle is not whether a given security-financed
project is efficient for a firm to pursue. The answer to that question is
quite clear: security-financed projects are efficient when the reduc-
tion in the expected bankruptcy share of prior creditors is less than
the expected returns to the firm from the financed project. This
question, however, is tangential to the security debate. Rather, the
fundamental theoretical question requires a comparison between pro-
ject financing with security and project financing without security.
Thus the core question remains: why and when does the method of
financing increase the net revenues from any positive value project the
firm elects to pursue?
1. A Promising Beginning: Using Leverage to Respond to the
Problem of Risk Alteration
We do not yet have a fully persuasive theory of secured finance
that withstands empirical refutation, but, contrary to the assertions of
many skeptics, we have made some significant progress. We do know
something. Virtually all the explanations for the efficiencies of secured
financing focus on the ways in which secured credit can better control
agency costs within the firm by reducing conflicts of interest between
the debtor's managers (representing the residual equity claimants)
and the firm's debt holders.18 Four main types of conflict (commonly
designated as "debtor misbehavior") have been identified.' 9 Of these,
the twin problems of overinvestment (or risk alteration) and under-
investment are the most promising candidates for explaining the wel-
fare benefits of secured financing.
The risk alteration conflict has the most general application.
Debt is, in many cases, an optimal means of financing new projects
that add value to the firm. However, debt carries as well the potential
conflict of risk alteration: there is an incentive for the firm's manag-
18 Most of the early work on the agency cost theory of secured debt focused on reduc-
tions in monitoring costs. See, e.g., Jackson & Kronman, supra note 1, at 1149-61; Levmore,
supra note 1. These early efforts are criticized in Schwartz, The Continuing Puzzle, supra note
1. Much of the recent work has shifted focus to the bonding advantages of security. See
infra pp. 1450-52.
19 The classic typology-dividend payment, claim dilution, asset substitution, and un-
derinvestment-is attributed to Charles W. Smith & Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Con-
tracting An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7J. FIN. ECON. 117, 118-19 (1979).
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ers, who represent residual equity interests, to engage in higher-risk
projects than they would if they bore the full share of the down-side
risk of project failure. If the project succeeds, the equity interests cap-
ture all the gains, but if the project fails, the losses are shared with the
debtholders. The debt cushion, in other words, can lead to exces-
sively risky investments. 20
The risk alternation problem generates agency costs that reduce
firm value. All parties have an incentive to structure their financing
contracts so as to reduce these costs. Thus, if one method of financ-
ing offers the parties a superior mechanism for ameliorating the risk
alteration problem, it is in the interests of all to select the cost mini-
mizing alternative. There are plausible reasons, supported by some
substantial empirical data,2' to believe that secured financing is supe-
rior to other financing alternatives in reducing the costs of risk altera-
tion by permitting the debtor credibly to commit not, to pursue
inferior higher-risk projects.2 2 The empirical data suggests that the
comparative advantage of security derives principally for the singular
advantages of leverage. By taking a security interest in specific assets
of the debtor, the secured credit6r enjoys rights of foreclosure upon
default that can inflict substantial costs on the debtor's business. The
leverage of secured financing reduces the enforcement costs of loan
covenants that forbid the debtor from incurring additional debt with-
out permission.2
3
Precisely how does security function to reduce the costs of finan-
cial contracts? The contractual relationship between debtor and cred-
itor is a relational contract in which one party performs a service for
another. A key goal in the regulation of such agency relationships is
to encourage the agent to serve its principal's interests as well as its
20 See generally Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Lia-
bilities, 81 J. PoL ECON. 637 (1973) (deriving a theoretical valuation formula for options,
corporate liabilities, and the optimal discount to apply).
21 In his study of creditors' and debtors' financing decisions, Ron Mann found that
"one of the.., most significant advantages of secured credit in practice is that it enhances
the lender's ability to limit subsequent borrowings." Mann, supra note 1, at 641; see also
FRANK P. JoHNsoN & RIcHARD D. JOHNSON, BANK MANAGEMENT 160 (1983) ("For most se-
cured commercial loans, the purpose of collateral is to provide a backup source of repay-
ment in case of default and to limit the borrower's capacity to borrow from other
sources."). Mann identifies the value of security as a means of "mitigating [the] incentive
problems" that result from the debtor's incentives to engage in "risky conduct". Mann,
supra note 1, at 649 (emphasis omitted). Although he rejects the conventional terms of
analysis, Mann's findings are strong confirmation that financers take security as a means of
regulating the risk alteration problem.
22 See F.H. BucKLEY, OPrIMAL PERSONAL LEVERAGE AND FRESH START PoucIES 43-44
(1994); Adler, supra note 1, at 78-79; Kanda & Levmore, supra note 1, at 2108-18.
23 The key significance of leverage was first identified in Scott, supra note 1, at 926-30.
Subsequent field studies have confirmed its significance in influencing the choices that
financers and debtors make among alternative methods of financing projects. See Mann,
supra note 1, at 638-68.
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own. Several characteristics of agency relationships contribute to the
risk of self-interested actions. In contrast to performance under a sim-
ple contingent contract, the agent's performance is complex and not
readily reducible to specific obligations. Satisfactory performance de-
mands considerable decisionmaking discretion, and monitoring the
quality of the agent's performance may be difficult. The objective for
the parties in structuring the optimal financial contract is, first, to en-
courage the debtor to take the creditor's interests properly into ac-
count in making decisions, and second, to facilitate detection of its
failure to do so. 2
4
The means used to achieve the desired goals are usefully grouped
into two broad categories. Monitoring arrangements allow the credi-
tor to supervise the debtor's actions so as to detect and sanction con-
duct, such as risk alteration, in pursuit of selfish ends. Bonding
arrangements, on the other hand, align the interest of the debtor with
that of the creditor through self-limiting constraints that serve a
precommitment function. Although they constrain the debtor's be-
havior, bonding arrangements will be desired equally by both debtors
and creditors, to the extent that they substitute for even more costly
monitoring efforts.25 Thus, a debtor is motivated to accept the impo-
sition of foreclosure sanctions upon default, thereby providing assur-
ance to a creditor that the debtor will not act contrary to the creditor's
ends. In sum, the unique features of security function as a highly ef-
fective bonding mechanism to ensure faithful compliance with the
terms of the financial contract. By offering its assets as a hostage, the
debtor invites the sanction of foreclosure should it breach the terms
of the agreement.
The singular advantages of leverage are widely understood
among financers. In a field study I conducted in 1986, creditors uni-
formly reported that they valued security principally for its "psycholog-
ical advantage [s] ."26 Creditors reported that the threat of foreclosure
increased significantly the debtor's level of compliance with loan cove-
nants, especially negative pledge clauses. The primary value of collat-
24 See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L.
REv. 1089, 1092-94 (1981).
25 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behav-
ior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976). Jensen and
Meckling were the first to establish rigorously the reciprocal relationship between bonding
and monitoring functions. Through bonding, the agent guarantees that she will not take
certain actions which would harm the principal or ensures that the principal will be com-
pensated if she does take such actions. Ex ante, these precommitments benefit the agent
as well as the principal to the extent that they increase the value of the performance being
provided. The enhanced performance is reflected in a higher price paid to the agent for
her services. Thus, self-limiting constraints will be voluntarily assumed whenever these
precommitments can substitute for more costly monitoring alternatives.
26 Scott, supra note 1, at 945.
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eral was thus thought to be the power to enforce the debtor's
contractual commitments. 27 A more expansive field study recently un-
dertaken by Ronald Mann has strongly confirmed the results I found
in 1986.28 Mann finds that, "[t]he lender's ability to inflict severe
losses on the borrower through the exercise of the lender's rights in
the borrower's collateral enhances the borrower's incentive to refrain
from conduct that the lender views as unduly risky and to operate its
business in accordance with the lenders' desires."29
The theoretical literature has underestimated the significance of
the leverage that security offers. The conventional theoretical objec-
tion to the leverage theory has been that creditors could accomplish
the same goal simply by writing into the contract loan covenants that
would call the loan whenever the debtor engaged in risk alteration.
Such a "forcing contract" would simply require the debtor not to un-
dertake subsequent investments that do not carry positive present
value for the firm. The problem, however, is that while the financer
can observe the disfavored action, it would be extraordinarily complex
to describe in a contract the relation between the optimal action (es-
chewing inefficient investments) and the state or the world as it mate-
rializes in a manner sufficient to persuade a third party (such as a
court) that the action has occurred. The disfavored behavior is ob-
servable but nonverifiable.30
Thus, security solves a contracting problem for the parties by al-
lowing them to "design verifiability"31 in the contract. Although the
financer cannot verify that a subsequent investment is inefficient, it
can observe such action. The ability to foreclose on the collateral
once an inefficient investment decision is observed precludes the ne-
cessity of verifying that action to a court.32 In an important sense, the
contract becomes self-enforcing.
27 See id. at 944-46.
28 Mann, supra note 1, at 638-58.
29 Id. at 655.
30 The assumption that certain actions are observable but not verifiable is a common
assumption in the contract decision theory literature. See Benjamin E. Hermalin &
Michael L. Katz, Judicial Modification of Contracts Between Sophisticated Parties: A More Complete
View of Incomplete Contracts and Their Breach, 9 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 230, 236-42 (1993). A
factor is observable when a party can observe it. A factor is verifiable when the facts rele-
vant to the factor can be proved to a court in a costjustified way. Some factors, such as the
true state of the world, can be observed but are thought to be too complicated to make
describing them in a contract, and proving them to a court, to be cost-justified. The empir-
ical evidence suggests that risk-altering investment decisions are such a factor. See generally
Alan Schwartz, The Default Rule Paradigm and the Limits of Contract Law, 3 S. CAL. IrERDisc.
LJ. 389 (1993) (addressing the deficiencies in contracts scholarship relating to the analysis
of default rules).
31 The notion of designing verifiability was first suggested by Randy Picker. Randal C.
Picker, Designing Verifiability: Implementing Mechanisms for Distributing Assets in Bank-
ruptcy (Jan. 30, 1997) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
32 See Mann, supra note 1, at 655; Scott, supra note 1, at 926-27.
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The results of these field studies and other reports from observa-
tion thus suggest that security provides an enforcement mechanism
that significantly increases the effectiveness of certain loan cove-
nants.33 Creditors rely heavily on the precommitment of security as a
bonding mechanism to reduce the agency costs of enforcing negative
pledge clauses and other prohibitions against future debt. Moreover,
because the secured creditor can focus its monitoring on specific as-
sets, the debtor is more willing to commit to covenants that will more
efficiently control risk alteration. Common provisions include
prohibitions on the sale of the collateral without the creditor's con-
sent (a form of risk alteration often designated as asset substitution),
as well as covenants that condition future business decisions on prior
approval from the secured creditor.3 4 Because the secured creditor
can focus its energies on preservation of the collateral, it can more
effectively control the conflicts that otherwise would require more
broad-based monitoring of the general stability of the debtor's
business.
The risk alteration problem is tricky, however, because efforts to
correct for excessive investment may create the reverse problem of
excessive conservatism. In short, a mechanism that works to align the
incentives of the equity holders may cause an offsetting misalignment
of the incentives of the debtholders. Once secured debt is issued, the
effects of leverage may lead the creditor to be myopic in refusing to
permit the firm to finance positive value projects. The debtholder,
with a fixed return, has a perverse incentive to forbid the debtor from
taking additional risks, even though the opportunities have positive
value for the firm. One method of resolving the problem of excessive
conservatism of existing secured creditors is to contract for authority
to seek alternative sources of secured financing for the assets needed
to pursue additional positive value projects. Such an agreement per-
mits the debtor to obtain new assets for new ventures by offering an-
other creditor a security interest superior to the earlier-in-time
secured claim. While this escape hatch of superpriority for certain
types of secured credit (such as PMSIs and purchasers of chattel pa-
per) may help solve the problem of creditor myopia, it does so only at
the cost of diminishing the potency of the initial leverage thatjustified
the issuance of secured debt in the first instance. 35 Thus, the cost-
reducing properties of leverage are, at best, a blunt instrument that
may be incapable of precise manipulation through legal rules.
33 See Mann, supra note 1, at 651.
34 See id.
35 See Scott, supra note 1, at 962-63.
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2. Using Leverage to Reduce Underinvestment Conflicts
The risk alteration conflict is ubiquitous and occurs in all debt
contracts. There is a final conflict that is peculiar to exclusive financ-
ing arrangements, and for which secured financing offers similar ad-
vantages over financing alternatives. The problem of
underinvestment occurs when a debtor, having recouped a portion of
its investment in a joint venture with a creditor, siphons off its re-
sources to other projects from which it will reap more of the gain.
The debtor will act in this manner even if further effort in the joint
venture would enhance the firm's net worth.36 Once again, the lever-
age offered by a security interest in the debtor's assets gives a secured
creditor the ability credibly to threaten sanctions if it discovers that
the debtor is undertaking inadequate efforts to fully develop the fi-
nanced project.
A wrap-around security interest (or "floating lien") offers several
advantages to the creditor and debtor seeking to cement an exclusive
financing relationship.37 The leverage of security has the effect of giv-
ing the creditor an economic hostage to ensure the debtor's faithful
performance of the financed project.38 If the debtor defaults on any
of the covenants in the financial contract, the creditor retains the
power to foreclose and take operational control of the assets. The
debtor agrees to this arrangement because there are significant costs
to the creditor in exercising the power of foreclosure that deter frivo-
lous or bad faith actions by the creditor. The effectiveness of the
debtor's bond encourages the creditor, in turn, to provide financial
36 See Stewart C. Myers, Determinants of Corporate Borrowing, 5J. FIN. ECON. 147 (1977).
Growth opportunities are analogous to call options. The value of these options depends
on whether the firm uses them optimally. But if the firm has outstanding risky debt, situa-
tions can arise in which shareholders do not benefit even from highly profitable invest-
ment decisions, because the benefits go primarily to the debtholders. In these instances,
the "options" may not be exercised at all, and the firm's value is accordingly reduced. Id,
at 148-49.
37 In his recent paper, Ron Mann rejects the claim that I had advanced in 1986 that
floating lien security interests are used to cement exclusive financing relationships and
that there are significant efficiency gains to the parties from relational security. Mann,
supra note 1, at 656-57. His evidence that relational financing is not a significant factor in
financial contracting is based upon the data from Berger & Udell that shows that only 26%
of secured loans are made in exclusive financing relationships. Allen N. Berger & Gregory
F. Udell, Relationship Lending and Lines of Credit in Small Firm Finance, 68 J. Bus. 351, 372
(1995). This appears to be a classic baseline problem. I never suggested in 1986, nor do I
believe now, that exclusive financing relationships were the only pattern of secured financ-
ing. My only claim was that exclusive financing was an important lending pattern and that
participants reported, and theory confirmed, that the leverage granted by security could
reduce conflicts inherent in these relationships. In my view, the Berger & Udell data sup-
port the claim that secured credit is used in important classes of cases as a method of
solving underinvestment problems in exclusive financing relationships.
38 See Scott, supra note 1, at 928-29; Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using
Hostages to Support Exchange 73 AM. ECON. Rxv. 519, 522-26 (1983).
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management and counseling to enhance the general business pros-
pects for the debtor. The creditor cannot provide these valuable serv-
ices as cheaply unless it can structure the relationship so as to capture
the returns from its efforts. Secured financing ensures that the debtor
will heed the creditor's financial advice. Once again, however, the
benefits of leverage are not cost-free. Debtors must submit to substan-
tial administrative supervision that imposes significant burdens on the
firms' decisionmaking processes.
Justifying secured financing as a uniquely effective means of con-
trolling the conflicts of interest generated by risk alteration and un-
derinvestment seems quite promising as a normative theory of
finance. The theory claims that secured debt is able to reduce agency
costs for firms financing positive value projects and thus returns bene-
fits to the firm that other financing alternatives could not capture.
The theory recognizes, however, that the leverage benefits of security
carry offsetting costs. Thus, it does not predict that secured credit
would be ubiquitous. Rather, it predicts that parties to financial con-
tracts will choose this method of financing in those contexts where the
expected benefits from leverage exceed the costs. To the extent,
then, that the net returns inform value from this method of financing
are greater than those obtainable from other methods of financing
the project, and exceed any reduction in the bankruptcy share of un-
secured creditors, secured credit is Kaldor-Hicks efficient.
3. Testing the Theory of Leverage Against the Rules of Article 9
The first test of any theory of secured financing requires that the
theory be roughly congruent with the priority scheme that is institu-
tionalized in Article 9. As Hideki Kanda and Saul Levmore have
shown, we can rationalize many of the priority rules of Article 9 as
attempts to balance the advantages and disadvantages of using secur-
ity to ameliorate the agency costs of risk alteration.3 9 Specifically, we
can understand the first-in-time priority granted to perfected secured
creditors over prior-in-time unsecured creditors, and the superpriority
granted to both subsequent purchase money security interests and
subsequent purchasers of chattel paper over prior-in-time perfected
secured creditors, as means of metering subsequent new money
financing.
The first-in-time priority granted to secured claims by the terms
of Article 9 can be explained as a cost-effective mechanism for
preventing risk alterations that would disadvantage prior creditors.
The leverage over the debtor that Article 9 grants to secured creditors
is an effective bonding mechanism by which debtors offer their assets
39 Kanda & Levmore, supra note 1, at 2108-21.
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as hostages against the commitment not to engage in further risky
investments. Security also focuses the monitoring efforts of the credi-
tor and further reduces the agency costs of debt. Other financing al-
ternatives, lacking the leverage features of security, provide less
credible commitments by the debtor and, in turn, impose more costly
monitoring efforts.
Nevertheless, the first-in-time rule is something of a blunt instru-
ment. Using security as a hostage may control the debtor's incentives,
but it also sets in motion a parallel set of conflicts involving the credi-
tor's incentives. Fully protected by the hostage of security, creditors
are motivated to be excessively cautious in refusing to permit subse-
quent financing that would enhance total returns to the firm. Thus,
the first-in-time rule must be tempered with a scheme of superpriori-
ties that offer the debtor an escape hatch to guard against creditor
myopia. Hence, purchase money security interests and subsequent
purchasers of chattel paper are granted priority over prior-in-time se-
cured creditors as a means of balancing the effects of using assets as
hostages. As Kanda and Levmore suggest, therefore, one can explain
the prominent contours of the priority system in Article 9 largely as a
crude, but effective, compromise between the advantages and disad-
vantages of new money financing.
40
The Kanda and Levmore explanation leaves one salient feature of
Article 9 unexplained: the institutionalization of the floating lien.
Here, the underinvestment problem is a useful supplement. Some
classes of debtors (the current estimate is twenty-six percent of se-
cured claims) 41 choose to enter into exclusive financing relationships
with creditors. For certain classes of debtors, these long term relation-
ships offer singular advantages in terms of providing financial coun-
seling and general business guidance. For those firms that find
exclusive financing optimal, the problem of underinvestment is pecu-
liarly salient. Once the debtor and creditor enter into these kinds of
joint ventures, the financing creditor is properly concerned about a
further conflict: the motivation that the debtor may have to pursue
other projects through which it can capture a greater share of the
returns. The unique priority Article 9 grants to the floating lien gen-
eral creditor in all the debtor's present and future assets appears to be
a sensible method of using the same hostage device to solve the un-
derinvestment problem that exclusive financing arrangements gener-
ate. In a world without secured credit, these arrangements might
proceed only at greater cost, and some parties would not pursue
otherwise beneficial exclusive financing arrangements. 42
40 Id. at 2114-21.
41 See Berger & Udell, supra note 37, at 372.
42 See ScmvARTZ & Scorr, supra note 9, at 680-85; Scott, supra note 1, at 930-33.
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For certain debtors, then, the blanket priority Article 9 gives to
the floating lien secured creditor invites the creditor to become a
joint venturer in the business opportunity. Thereafter, the creditor
has an incentive to provide financial counseling and management ad-
vice to the debtor firm and, just as importantly, has the leverage to
ensure that firm acts on the advice. These benefits accrue to all par-
ties with claims against the firm to the extent that they enhance the
returns from financed projects.
In sum, it is fair to conclude that a regime that privileges secured
credit may enhance social welfare and that the scheme of priorities
institutionalized in Article 9 is roughly congruent with plausible expla-
nations of the comparative advantages of secured financing over other
financing alternatives.
B. Theory v. Practice: Explaining Observed Patterns of Secured
Debt
The central problem with this (and any other) theory of secured
financing is the inconsistency between the predictions of the theory
and observations of the actual patterns of secured financing that exist
in the world. The leverage theory would predict that secured credit,
although not ubiquitous (because it entails substantial costs), would
nonetheless be observed in all segments of the credit market. This is
because the agency problems upon which the theory rests are com-
mon to firms of all types, large and small, stable and volatile. Here,
however, the empirical evidence casts substantial doubt on the efficacy
of any agency cost explanation to explain fully the puzzle of secured
debt. In a recent study of over one million business loans, Allen Ber-
ger and Gregory Udell concluded that the issuance of secured debt
positively correlates to both the riskiness of the project and the finan-
cial volatility of the debtor.43 This study confirms the evidence from
field studies that secured debt remains, to this day, a method of fi-
nancing that dominates second-class markets as the "poor man's"
means of obtaining credit. Although security is observed in large and
small firms, the single most salient correlation is the relative absence
of secured credit from the balance sheets of most financially sound
companies.44
Why should that be? Ron Mann's field study suggests that, for
many debtors, the substantial administrative costs of submitting to
creditor monitoring and supervision outweigh the efficiency benefits
43 Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, Collateral, Loan Quality, and Bank Risk, 25 J.
MONETARY ECON. 21, 27-40 (1990).
44 SeeJohn D. Leeth &Jonathan A. Scott, The Incidence of Secured Debt: Evidence from the
Small Business Community, 24J. FIN. & QUANTITATrVE ANALfSis 379, 383, 389 (1989); Mann,
supra note 1, at 668-74; Scott, supra note 1, at 940-41.
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of leverage. 45 Most debtors and creditors see these costs as sufficiently
high such that the decision to grant security, can be justified only
when the efficiency benefits of leverage work in combination with the
ability of the creditor to use that same leverage to improve its
probability of repayment vis-a-vis other creditors. The leverage the se-
cured creditor can use to reduce the conflicts stemming from risk al-
teration is also available to increase the probability of repayment of
the secured creditor's debt.
46
Let me hasten to note that neither Mann nor his subjects seem to
recognize the powerful theoretical implications of this data. Indeed,
Mann seems to believe that his work provides some support for the
grant of full priority to secured creditors in bankruptcy.4 7 But, if these
field observations accurately reflect the justifications for issuing se-
cured debt, they clearly imply that the efficiency benefits of security
are generally insufficient to justify the substantial administrative costs
occasioned by loss of control and flexibility in decisionmaking. Only
when those social benefits combine with a private benefit-the reduc-
tion in the issuing creditor's risk of nonpayment-will a secured loan
be cost-justified.
A moment's reflection reveals the problem: this private benefit is
redistributional. The only way that a creditor can increase the
probability of repayment out of a fixed pool of assets is by insuring
that its debt will be preferred over others. The risk of nonpayment
arises when the total amount of creditors' claims exceeds the value of
the debtor's assets. Thus, any increase that leverage can generate in
the probability of repayment of a secured creditor produces a corre-
sponding reduction in the probability of repayment of other credi-
tors' claims.48
What exactly is the nature of this repayment leverage and how
does it function? In Mann's study, creditors identify this leverage as a
variation on the "lost value" problem: the perception that, owing to
operational synergies, the collateral has greater value in the debtor's
45 Mann, supra note 1, at 658-68.
46 See id. at 645-49.
47 Id. at 682-83.
48 This point seems clear, but because it seems to have been lost on many of those
who pursue bottom-up analyses, it bears repeating. In short, the claim that security is is-
sued because it reduces a creditor's risks is more properly understood as the claim that
debtors issue security in order to redistribute wealth away from uninformed creditors to
themselves and sometimes to their informed creditors. There are two normative objec-
tions to this explanation for secured credit. First, in a risk reduction story, the issuance of
security does not increase society's wealth; rather, it just makes some parties richer at the
expense of others. Under this analysis, given that security is costly to issue, secured debt is
normatively objectionable because it generates social costs but has insufficiently offsetting
social benefits. The second objection rests on distributional fairness; that is, secured credit
redistributes wealth in the wrong direction. See infra Part III.
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hands than in the creditor's. 49 Repossession thus can inflict more loss
on the debtor than the value of the asset that is securing the debt.50
Security, in this conception, functions once again as a hostage. This
time, the hostage bonds the debtor to a commitment to prefer the
creditor's claim over the claims of others in the event of insolvency.
Even though secured debt is perceived as carrying the singular
benefit of increasing the probability of repayment, financing parties
understand it as an extremely crude device. Because providing assets
as hostages imposes corresponding risks of creditor misbehavior,
Mann reports that creditors and debtors are reluctant to use security
except where significant reductions in nonpayment risks supplement
its efficiency advantages.51 In other words, when the ex ante risk of
nonpayment is significant, the redistributional benefits derived from
leverage offer the additional advantages that justify the costs of using
secured financing.5 2 Mann's analysis thus provides a coherent ac-
count for the persistent pattern of secured debt issued primarily by
firms with unproven track records or firms that are financially volatile.
For financially stable firms, secured debt remains unattractive presum-
ably because the risk of nonpayment is trivial and the efficiency bene-
fits of security are inadequate, standing alone, to justify the substantial
costs.
5 3
C. Market Imperfections that Support the Redistributional Story:
The Nonadjustment Phenomenon
It is dangerous, of course, to draw too many conclusions from
observations by market participants. Perceptions by debtors and cred-
itors that secured credit is costjustified only when the redistributional
benefits of leverage are substantial may not reflect the underlying eco-
49 Mann, supra note 1, at 665-66.
50 See Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the Regulation of Coercive Creditor Remedies, 89 COLUM.
L. REv. 730 (1989). The "lost value" that results whenever the creditor forecloses on the
security is, of course, a product of the hostage function that security plays. A self-enforcing
remedy, such as foreclosure, has a valuable regulatory function, one that enables the par-
ties to achieve mutually advantageous objectives. From an ex ante perspective, the lost
value potential inherent in remedial options such as foreclosure is merely the modem
version of an ancient institution: the effective the particular mechanism is in advancing
the parties' collective goals. It is important to emphasize that the right to repossess upon
default is not an assurance that, if the debtor defaults, the asset will be sufficient to repay
the debt. That may or may not be the case. Instead, the value of the commitment derives
from the penalty that it imposes upon the debtor, not from the benefit that it offers the
creditor. An effective commitment by the debtor includes any move that will leave the
debtor in a position where the option of choosing to default will impose more costs than
any benefits the debtor could derive from misbehaving. A credible commitment thus re-
quires the debtor to assume a sufficiently severe penalty so that in all cases it would prefer
to carry out the promise to pay in full. See id. at 741-49.
51 Mann, supra note 1, at 638, 39.
52 See id. at 639-41.
53 See id. at 639, 671-74.
1458 [Vol. 82:1436
THE TRUTH ABOUT SECURED FINANCING
nomic reality. Thus, the related question recurs: if the market for
credit is competitive, would not increases in the costs of extending
credit experienced by unsecured creditors, whom secured debt disad-
vantages, be reflected in higher interest charges, and thus, in the
debtor's total interest bill? Many have long recognized that noncon-
sensual creditors-such as warranty claimants and tort claimants-can
recover only fixed-rate interest charges form debtors and would not
be able to adjust to the presence of secured debt.54 But surely, this
relatively small group of creditors cannot drive the institution of se-
cured finance?
Lucian Bebchuk andJesse Fried have offered the most promising
explanation for why debtors do not internalize the redistributional ef-
fects of secured credit. 55 Bebchuk and Fried explain the long term
persistence of important classes of consensual creditors as "non-adjust-
ing" creditors.56 They rely essentially on a transaction-costs argument
to explain why prior-in-time consensual unsecured creditors (even
those with large claims) and all consensual creditors with small claims
would not rationally adjust to the increased risk occasioned by a par-
ticular debtor's decision to issue secured debt. If the cost of designing
and enforcing adjustable rate provisions is too high, a rational credi-
tor will assign an average value to the heightened risk of nonpayment,
a value that is not sensitive to the lending patterns of the particular
debtor.5 7 Any one of the classes of creditors Bebchuk and Fried iden-
tify may be insufficiently large to account for the redistributional ef-
fects of security. However, in combination, the presence of large
numbers of creditors who either cannot or do not rationally choose to
adjust to the increased risk of secured debt offers a strong market-
based explanation for why debtors may systematically fail to internal-
ize the redistributional costs of security.
Bebchuk and Fried emphasize the efficiency implications of
nonadjustment.58 It may well be that nonadjusting consensual credi-
tors who are repeat players are fully compensated for the increased
risks of doing business in competition with secured debt.5 9 Neverthe-
less, the redistributional costs of security are independent of any fair-
ness arguments that might be advanced in favor of involuntary or
single-play participants in credit markets. The negative externalities
that nonadjustment generates will skew the debtor's incentives in im-
54 See, e.g., Thomas H.Jackson &Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay
on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditor's Bargain, 75 VA. L. REv. 155, 177-78 (1989); Lynn M.
LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80 VA. L. REv. 1887, 1896-1903 (1994).
55 Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 1, at 898-900.
56 Id. at 882-91.
57 See id. at 887.
58 Id. at 886.
59 See id. at 886.
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portant respects. To the extent that debtors and secured creditors do
not internalize the costs of secured credit, the debtor's investment de-
cisions are skewed. Debtors will issue more secured debt than would
be issued in a world where the contracting parties appreciated all the
costs and benefits. This inefficiency leads to underutilization of other
financing alternatives that might better enhance the returns from fi-
nancing positive-value projects.
D. The "Discontinuity Assumption": Secured Debt as the Only
Method of Financing Positive-Value Projects
Several commentators have mounted a strong defense of secured
credit that posits a class of debtors with positive value financing
projects that is unable to secure financing except by issuing secured
debt.60 In other words, the claim goes, there is a discontinuity in the
financing alternatives that are typically available to solvent debtors
with positive-value projects. This claim was advanced some years ago
by Homer Kripke 6' and subsequently by Charles Mooney and Steve
Harris. 62 Most recently, Steven Schwarcz has argued that solvent debt-
ors who confront a "liquidity crisis" are often unable to finance their
projects or to fully realize the benefits from existing projects without
new money that debtors can obtain on the market only by issuing se-
cured debt.63 Schwarcz, along with Kripke and Harris and Mooney,
support this "discontinuity assumption" by reference to experience
and to (unsystematic)field studies.6
The discontinuity assumption is the linchpin of the argument for
preserving full priority for secured credit. From the assumption that
for many debtors new money financing can be obtained only by offer-
ing security, it follows that the security-financed project that offers a
greater return to the firm than any corresponding reduction in bank-
ruptcy share to unsecured creditors is Kaldor-Hicks efficient. Indeed,
the efficiency problem of nonadjusting creditors largely disappears.
Because using security to finance these projects is efficient, it follows
that the misinvestment and precaution concerns Bebchuk and Fried
raise are nonexistent. 65 A redistributional issue remains, of course,
but even there one can advance the argument that most nonadjusting
creditors are fully compensated in the enhanced returns from projects
that creditors could not pursue but for security. Thus, given the as-
sumption, the burden of proof on the empirical question should shift
60 See infra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
61 Kripke, supra note 6, at 969-70.
62 Harris & Mooney, supra note 1, at 2042-43.
63 Schwarcz, supra note 6, at 18-58.
64 Harris & Mooney, supra note 1, at 2028-37; Kripke, supra note 6, at 941-49;
Schwarcz, supra note 6, at 44-49.
65 Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 1, at 898-900.
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to those who wish to constrain the choices market actors would other-
wise select. The normative implication follows: secured claims that
facilitate positive value projects should be accorded full priority in
bankruptcy.
But, of course, nothing is as easy as it seems. The discontinuity
assumption is not a theoretical claim about the efficiency of secured
debt. Rather, it is an empirical claim that, given a world with secured
credit, and given the reasons why debtors and creditors choose to fi-
nance new money with security, whatever those reasons happen to be, some
positive-value projects can be financed only with security. This is not
to say that, in a world without secured credit (or a world that granted
reduced priority to secured claims), unsecured debt or equity would
not finance these positive-value projects. Nor does it suggest that all
(or even most) of the security-financed projects currently undertaken
are efficient. Indeed, it is perfectly consistent with the discontinuity
assumption, and with the evidence from field studies of existing pat-
terns of secured financing, to assert that these liquidity-crisis projects
demand security primarily for its redistributional effects rather than
its efficiencies. The most plausible reason why solvent, high-risk debt-
ors can issue only secured debt is that the leverage security provides
can substantially reduce the risk of nonpayment for the secured credi-
tor. It is unlikely, after all, that new money secured financing of via-
ble, high-risk debtors is primarily aimed at controlling risk alteration
or underinvestment conflicts.
Thus, the discontinuity assumption merely begs the question.
Even if true, it tells us what we already know from observation: se-
cured credit is issued for a number of complex reasons that all center
on the unique advantage of leverage to the secured creditor. To some
extent, that leverage seems to be a singularly useful means of reducing
conflicts of interest inherent in financial contracting relationships.
These benefits are efficiency enhancing. To some degree, however,
that leverage also appears to be a singularly useful means of enhanc-
ing the creditor's probability of repayment relative to other creditors.
If, as seems plausible, some (or many) of these other creditors do not
adjust to this reduction in bankruptcy share, there is a redistributional
benefit to the creditor that the debtor does not fully internalize in
assessing its total interest bill. This, then, would lead to some ineffi-
cient uses of security (as well as raise problems of distributional fair-
ness). The question, in short, is simple: What are the relative values





What does the truth about secured credit imply? Any recommen-
dations to policymakers must account.for the fact that secured credit
is a regime of offsetting effects-some efficiencies and some ineffi-
ciencies-in a combination that is largely unknown and is likely to
remain an uncertainty for the foreseeable future.66 This debate thus
reduces to a central empirical question, the answer to which is cur-
rently unknown: What are the relative values or these two effects? If
nonadjusting creditors are statistically insignificant, in either their
number or the value of the claims that they hold, then the redistribu-
tional claim largely fails and the observed preference of many market
actors for secured credit is strong evidence of the dominating effects
of its cost-reducing properties. If the nonadjustment phenomenon is
significant, then the redistribution story is plausible, perhaps even
more plausible than the efficiency story.
In the absence of the data (which we may never know fully) what
should lawmakers do? One approach is to resolve doubts in favor of
Article 9 and the current regime of full priority for secured claims.
Steve Harris and Charles Mooney argue strenuously that the redis-
tributional effects of nonadjusting, nonconsensual creditors are trivial
and that other voluntary creditors can compensate by charging rates
that reflect, on average, the additional risks of subsequent security.6 7
The other response, advocated by Lynn LoPucki68 and Elizabeth War-
ren,69 is to resolve doubts in favor of classes of nonconsensual and
consensual unsecured creditors by granting them carve outs from the
Article 9 priority scheme and/or special protections in bankruptcy.
This debate reflects two separate normative claims. The first is a
fairness concern stimulated by the evidence of significant redistribu-
tion in debt financing. This objection rests on the claim that secured
debt redistributes wealth in the wrong direction. Sophisticated lend-
ers, such as banks and finance companies, will know of the existence
of security. These creditors can (and do) protect themselves against
66 It is fair to say that how much secured debt is issued for distributional reasons
remains an open question. There is some recent evidence, however, to suggest that the
fraction is not trivial. A recent study, for example, concluded that "the data suggest the
existence of a class of unprotected creditors who provide a positive stimulus to the issuance
of long term debt. The rationale for wealth transfer from this class has to come, a fortiori,
from market imperfections like... asymmetric information." Sris Chatterjee &James H.
Scott, Jr., Explaining Differences in Corporate Capital Structure 13 J. BANKING & FIN. 283, 307
(1989).
67 Harris & Mooney, supra note 1, at 2047-53.
68 LoPucki, supra note 1, at 1941-47, 1964-65.
69 Memorandum from Elizabeth Warren to the Council of the American Law Institute
(Apr. 25, 1996) (on file with author) (regarding Article 9 Set Aside for Unsecured
Creditors).
1462 [Vol. 82:1436
THE TRUTH ABOUT SECURED FINANCING
the issuance of secured debt through the interest rates they charge, or
they share in the gains that security generates by forcing the debtor to
split the pie. Creditors who are unlikely to know of the existence of
security or unable to protect themselves against it include employees
with wage claims, consumer purchasers who have warranty contracts
with the debtor, actual and potential tort claimants, and small suppli-
ers. The existence of secured debt may disadvantage all of these cred-
itors. Hence, to the extent that the distributional story holds, security
tends to redistribute wealth from the relatively poor and uninformed
to the rich and sophisticated. Shifting wealth in this direction is con-
trary to prevailing redistributional theories.
Concerns about regressive redistribution are influenced largely
by the degree to which unsophisticated creditors are adequately in-
formed of these additional risks through the Article 9 filing system,
Article 9's chief vehicle for overcoming information asymmetries.
Here, the Article 9 revision process to date provides little grounds for
supporting Harris-Mooney and some evidence favoring the LoPucki-
Warren position. The Article 9 revision process reflects an unresolved
tension between the filing system's goals of eliminating information
asymmetries and the goals of providing an efficient mechanism for
repeat players. 70 Indeed, several participants in the revision process
have argued for tabling the entire process on the grounds that the
filing system is more myth than reality, and the revision process is
merely perpetuating the myth.71 Despite this anecdotal evidence,
most neutral observers must still concede that the fairness case either
way is inconclusive.
The more nagging and important question concerns the effi-
ciency calculus. At this juncture, the efficiency debate (absent further
data) is normative-it involves critical value choices about what law is
best in a world we understand only imperfectly. Whatever position
one takes on the merits, it is precisely the kind of debate for which- the
ALI-NCCUSL lawmaking process that creates the Article 9 rules is ill-
suited. There is substantial reason to believe that when the products
of these private legislative efforts are the kind of admirably clear,
bright-line rules so distinctively present in Article 9, this is strong evi-
dence that a dominant interest group has influenced the process.
Bright-line rules are prevalent when an interest group dominates be-
cause they enable the interest group that prevails in the legislative
70 See, e.g., James J. White, Reforming Article 9 Priorities in Light of Old Ignorance and New
Filing Rules, 79 MiNN. L. REv. 529, 534 (1995) (depicting this tension as fairness versus
efficiency).
71 See Robert E. Scott, The Mythology of Article 9, 79 MINN. L. REv. 853, 856-57 (1995);
see also Symposium, "Managing the Paper Trail": Evaluating and Reforming the Article 9 Filing




process to preserve its victory in subsequentjudicial interpretations of
claims and rights.
7 2
Assuming such interest group influence exists, what effects can
one predict? When a single interest group, such as asset-based
financers, banks, and their lawyers, are dominant in the private legisla-
tive process, the group can often block proposals it dislikes and secure
passage of proposals it wants. The influence of such a group on the
outcomes of the lawmaking process is a product of the poor quality of
information the voters in the private legislature possess and the ability
of the interest group to make credible representations about the con-
sequences of particular proposals. (This phenomenon can be seen as
well in the rules governing payment systems and credit instruments in
Articles 3 and 4).73
The private legislative process that produces Article 9 may be
more susceptible to interest group influence than ordinary legisla-
tures for two reasons. First, ordinary legislatures have mechanisms for
reaching agreement (log-rolling) that permit normative debate to
reach a resolution-a resolution more clearly reflected in the legisla-
tive product. Second, ordinary legislatures have mechanisms for find-
ing facts (hearings) that are unavailable to private legislative groups,
and are exposed to many more sources of information concerning the
effects of the proposals which they consider. Information, in turn, is a
corrective to statutory products that the process itself skews.
But, of course, even if this is so, the issue is not fully resolved. We
are only beginning to understand the political economy of the private
legislatures that produce Article 9 and we have even less understand-
ing of the political economy of the bankruptcy lawmaking process.74
There is some impressionistic evidence that representatives of un-
secured creditors and debtors (through their managers) had a role in
molding the 1978 Bankruptcy Code 75 to suit their needs, which were
driven in large part by the sympathetic stance toward secured credi-
tors in Article 9. One salient example of this influence is the tug-of-
war over the validity of floating liens during insolvency. The treat-
ment of floating liens in Bankruptcy Code § 547(e) (3),76 supports the
inferences that the Bankruptcy Conference is itself susceptible to in-
terest group influence, and that interest groups seek to use the Bank-
72 See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 15, at 607-10.
73 See id. at 643-45; see also Edward L. Rubin, Thinking Like a Lawyer, Acting Like a Lobb)-
ist: Some Notes on the Process of Revising UCC Articles 3 and 4, 26 Loy. LA L. REv. 743, 748-59
(1993) (detailing industry influence during the deliberations of the ABA committee re-
viewing the revisions to Articles 3 and 4).
74 Several forthcoming papers offer new insights into the political economy of the
Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., Block-Lieb, supra note 16; Posner, supra note 16.
75 The Bankruptcy Code is codified in title 11 of the United States Code.
76 11 U.S.C. § 547(e) (3) (1994).
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ruptcy Code in order to trump Article 9 concessions to secured
creditors.
77
Rather than concentrating energies on further refinements in
the debate over secured credit, it would seem far more profitable for
scholars to begin to study the institutional processes which produce
the relevant legal rules. Indeed, given what we do know about the
private lawmaking process, it appears at best naive to continue to
frame the question solely in terms of whether secured claims should
be granted full or only partial priority in bankruptcy. Not only the
substance of the legal rules, but also the process that produces these
rules, should be the focus of scholarly inquiry. Normative critique
should take account of what the relevant lawmaker is capable of doing
and is likely to do. Over the short run, this approach may well further
obscure the choices among competing proposals for revision and re-
form. Over the longer term, however, our understanding of this po-
tential trend and other value-laden debates can only be enhanced if
academic attention focuses on inputs as well as outputs. In short, we
need more theory and more evidence relating not just to the optimal
rules governing secured credit, but to how the private lawmaking
groups that produce those laws actually function.
77 As I have noted previously,
The 1978 Bankruptcy Code was based on an act proposed by the National
Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, which in turn
was based in large part on work done by the National Bankruptcy Confer-
ence. Any claims about the role played by interest groups, either directly or
through the mediation of commercial lawyers... are necessarily specula-
tive.... [Moreover,] the U.C.C. Article 9 Study Group and the National
Bankruptcy Conference are not perfect mirror images of each other. The
Bankruptcy Conference has experienced a modest decline [in] influence in
recent years, and never enjoyed the official status of the U.C.C. Study
Groups.
Scott, supra note 16, at 1849 n. 215 (citations omitted).
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